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H I G H L I G H T S

Although the Berlin dispute has still found no solution in the Security Council, Soviet representative Vishinsky's moderate statement in vetoing the recent compromise proposal suggests that the USSR may eventually be willing to accept a face-saving compromise. The implicit willingness of the USSR to negotiate within the UN may reflect a Soviet awareness that the present success of the Berlin airlift has invalidated the blockade as a means of forcing the western powers to abandon their plans for western Germany (see page 2). Within Germany, the USSR has recently accelerated preparations for the eventual establishment of an eastern German government which could maintain Soviet domination either with or without the support of the Red army (see page 5).

General Assembly approval of the present Bernadotte plan has been made unlikely by Israeli military success in the Negeb and the likelihood that many UN members will support Jewish claims to that area (see page 2). Meanwhile, reports that Israeli forces are concentrating near Jerusalem indicate that an attack upon the city may be imminent (see page 11).

The hastening collapse of the Chinese National Government may result in the departure of Chiang Kai-shek at almost any time. It does not appear likely, however, that any succeeding government which might rise out of the tangled political situation could command as much support as Chiang (see page 13). Meanwhile, Communist armies in North China have intercepted Chiang's attempt to evacuate Nationalist forces from Manchuria (see page 13). In Korea, an armed invasion of South Korea by the Communist forces from the north is not likely at the present time (see page 14).

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UNITED NATIONS

Soviet representative Vishinsky's moderate veto statement, made during the voting on the Security Council compromise proposal, suggests that the USSR may be interested in an eventual face-saving solution of the Berlin dispute. Vishinsky barely referred to the contention of the USSR that the UN has no jurisdiction over the Berlin controversy. The Soviet representative defended the veto largely on the grounds that the proposed ending of the blockade and the introduction of the Soviet currency in Berlin were not to be simultaneous. This implicit willingness to accept the UN as a forum for negotiation on Berlin indicates that there is still some possibility that the USSR is interested in finding a compromise solution to the dispute.

The Soviet Union may now be inclined toward conciliation because it recognizes that the Berlin blockade has failed to dissuade the western powers from proceeding with a separate organization for western Germany or to force them out of Berlin. The USSR may even recognize that the present success of the airlift, combined with the firm stand of the western powers, has: (1) raised western prestige in Germany and increased German hostility to the Soviet Union; (2) spurred western plans for rearmament and military coalition; and (3) precipitated the local problem of Berlin into a crisis of world scope, far exceeding Soviet calculations. While awaiting further developments in the UN, the USSR will also look for positive evidence that the airlift can, or cannot, overcome the Berlin winter.

General Assembly approval of the original Bernadotte plan is now unlikely following Israeli success in the Negeb and in view of the probability that many UN members will support Israeli claims to that area. Approval of the original plan is unlikely unless it receives the strong support of the

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US and UK and the Jews are forced to withdraw from the Negeb. However, the Assembly will probably attempt a settlement in Palestine by modifying the Bernadotte plan, perhaps allowing the Jews part of the Negeb. Despite Arab opposition, such a solution if strongly backed by the US and UK could probably receive the necessary two-thirds vote. The final test, however, of UN ability to impose a Palestine settlement will be its willingness to agree to a final delimitation of boundaries and to guarantee these boundaries by sanctions or force. The absence of strong UN guarantees of enforcement over a protracted period will result in the Arabs and particularly the Jews continuing to ignore UN decisions, and chaos in the Near East will continue.

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G E N E R A L

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) faces imminent disintegration following the recent decision of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) to recommend that WFTU suspend activities for a year. WFTU refusal to comply with this demand will result in the withdrawal of TUC from the organization. The CIO will probably follow the lead of TUC at its Executive Committee meeting in November, and other non-Communist labor organizations are expected to take similar action. These defections will reduce considerably the benefits now enjoyed by the Kremlin which has used the WFTU to advance the contention that the USSR is the guardian of working class unity. Although the USSR will attempt to minimize the effects of the British move and preserve the semblance of a world labor movement, its chances of success are negligible without surrender of Soviet control over WFTU. Under these circumstances and in the face of an emerging western labor organization in Paris, the USSR may be forced to reorganize the remnants of the WFTU on a more exclusively Communist basis or launch an eastern European labor group.

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WESTERN EUROPE

GERMANY

Soviet action in eastern Germany during the past three months indicates that the Kremlin is accelerating preparations which would permit the establishment of an eastern German government capable of assuring Soviet domination with or without the support of Soviet occupation troops. The Communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party (SED) is undergoing a purge which will ultimately replace all members of non-Communist parties and unreliable Communists now holding key positions in the SED with reliable Stalinist Communists. The cadre thus formed will become the instrument for tightening Communist control of the SED, the Volkskongress, and other Communist front organizations. In conjunction with Soviet domination of the German Economic Commission and the Administration of the Interior, the SED will contribute materially to Soviet control of eastern Germany through a Communist minority. Moreover, a disciplined SED will facilitate Soviet-Communist control of the Soviet sector of Berlin following the anticipated split in the Berlin city government after the 5 December western sector elections. In addition, eventual Soviet domination of eastern Germany is being facilitated by efforts to strengthen and reorganize the Administration of the Interior. The Administration, through the SED party structure, is now in practically full control of the zonal government down to a county level; the framework of the Administration thus is strikingly similar to the centralized police system of the Nazi regime. The Administration can now exercise most of the powers of a Ministry of the Interior in a totalitarian state, including control of public prosecutors through the criminal police. Approximately 15,000 specially trained and selected police, under the control of the Administration and quartered in barracks throughout the Soviet Zone, are being equipped

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GERMANY

with carbines and machine guns, and they may eventually be equipped with heavier weapons. In the hope of appealing to German nationalism, this new police force may be headed by Germans formerly identified with the Free German Committee.

FRANCE

The forceful eviction of the striking French miners and the rising public resentment of Communist-inspired work stoppages will probably force the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) to accept a face-saving compromise on the coal strike from the Queuille Government. The Queuille Government has already publicly criticized the CGT and indicated that the coal strike will be settled even if the Government has to negotiate a settlement with non-CGT miner representatives. Such an act by the French Government would openly cast doubt upon the qualification of the CGT as a representative for French labor. No matter how or when the coal strike is settled, the role of France in the recovery of western Europe will continue to be restricted by its internal economic and political instability. And, the production lost during the coal strike, plus any wage concessions made to the miners by the government, will only add to the already-threatening inflationary pressures in France.

ITALY

Eventual Italian membership in a western Europe federation is receiving increased support among Italian governmental and political leaders. Italian participation in a western European alliance is being more strongly championed by the De Gasperi Government and a tendency

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ITALY

is developing among the previously "neutral" moderate Leftists and Conservatives to shift support to the Government position. Although continued opposition may be expected from the extreme leftist and die-hard isolationist elements, pro-western elements in governmental and political circles will probably win both popular and public support for Italian participation in some kind of a western European grouping.

UNITED KINGDOM

Continued Commonwealth solidarity seems assured by the recently concluded Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers, despite prior British official concern that the Conference would aggravate conflicting Dominion interests. The Conference revealed that: (1) a consciousness of common interests overshadowed any sharp disagreements between certain dominions on specific issues; (2) the Commonwealth is unanimous in its opposition to Communism; (3) the dominions endorsed UK military commitments under the Brussels Pact; (4) the dominions, while expressing concern over the impact of the European recovery program on their economies, apparently accepted the British contention that UK economic commitments to western Europe will serve the larger interests of the Commonwealth; and (5) the Commonwealth nations publicly affirmed the need for rearmament. The prospect for continued Commonwealth solidarity was enhanced by a UK agreement to:(1) permit fuller dominion consultation during the formation of policies affecting the Commonwealth countries; and (2) seek a satisfactory alternative to the Crown as a constitutional Commonwealth link and thereby enable Ireland to remain associated with the Commonwealth. A similar alternative would apply also to India and possibly South Africa, which aspire to be republics but desire to retain Commonwealth benefits.

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UNITED KINGDOM

The showdown between Communists and non-Communists in the British trade union movement may eventually result in a separate Communist trade union organization, but will further weaken Communist influence in the UK. The showdown was precipitated by the recent sharpening of Communist Party opposition to the Government and by the action of several Communist trade union officials in openly defying the pro-Labor Government policies of their own unions. Meanwhile, the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) has recommended that the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions cease its activities, a move which paves the way for eventual TUC withdrawal. The TUC has also forcefully renewed its recommendation to member unions that they rid themselves of Communists. A break-away Communist trade union organization would win little support from labor's rank and file.

ICELAND

The Communist Party's potential to provoke labor disturbances was reduced by its loss of control of Iceland's Labor Federation in recent elections. The non-Communist Cabinet will be relatively free from the threat of Communist retaliation in its attempts to implement essential economic reforms involving wage reductions. Closer cooperation with the US will also be facilitated.

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EASTERN EUROPE

SOVIET UNION

Soviet purchases of raw rubber are apparently being facilitated by the UK, the Netherlands, and Ceylon, despite evidence that the USSR is stockpiling large quantities of this vital strategic material. In recent years, Soviet imports of natural rubber have averaged 30,000 tons per annum; imports for 1948 are estimated at between 125-150,000 tons. Even if the USSR supplies the needs of the Soviet Zone Germany, total Soviet consumption of raw rubber in 1948 will probably not exceed 50,000 tons. The USSR will thus be able to add approximately a two-year supply to its rubber stockpile during 1948 in anticipation of formal sanctions which may be imposed by the West.

YUGOSLAVIA

Albania is currently assuming greater importance as a pawn in the Kremlin's political struggle against the Tito regime in Yugoslavia. In order to foster Albania's economic independence from Yugoslavia, the renewed USSR trade pact with Albania agrees to: (1) extend credits and construct factories in Albania; and (2) grant Albania considerable price advantages over those accorded by Yugoslavia. Concurrently, the Polish press has widely publicized its first trade treaty negotiations with Albania. Because Albania's economic importance to either the USSR or Poland is negligible, conclusion of these trade pacts represents further Soviet attempts to isolate Yugoslavia and to facilitate the eventual overthrow of Tito.

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YUGOSLAVIA

Present strained relations between Tito and the Kremlin indicate that the USSR may not support Yugoslavia's territorial claims in Trieste, Gorizia, and Slovene Carinthia. The USSR, by encouraging local pro-Cominform Communists to attack Yugoslav annexation claims, may be making a further effort to bring additional pressure on Tito. The USSR is thereby attacking Yugoslav nationalism by the unique expedient of fostering opposing nationalist tendencies among local pro-Cominform Communist parties. In fact, the Kremlin would temporarily permit loyal anti-Tito Communists to follow a line of reasoning which it outlaws on other fronts of its struggle for power. Meanwhile, the Tito Government is stressing its recurrent propaganda theme of Yugoslav nationalism, in an attempt to strengthen its support within the country in anticipation of a possible Kremlin sell-out.

FINLAND

The Finnish Government can probably withstand increased Communist efforts to undermine its stability. Communist-inspired strikes, making use of riots and picketing for the first time in Finland, are undoubtedly designed to achieve the overthrow of the Fagerholm regime by weakening the Social Democratic Party and to acquire Communist representation in the Government. Communist tactics, especially the extension of strikes to various industries, are not likely to be successful, however, because Communist methods and propaganda have apparently heightened Finnish disapproval and resistance. Police efforts to quell the rioting in recent strikes brought forth Communist protests of unconstitutionality. President Fagerholm, by approving submission to the Finnish Diet of legislation for the reorganization of the flagrantly communistic Valpo (Finnish State Police), has dealt another blow to Communist objectives. This legislation would greatly curtail the powers of the security police and reduce Communist chances of controlling this vital political force. Although alarms have been raised by "leaks" regarding Communist preparatinns for seizing governmental powers, the present Government can count on the loyalty of the police and army and should be able to suppress any attempted Communist coup.

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MILITARY SITUATION 29 OCTOBER 1948

Showing Israeli Advance into the Negeb

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

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

PALESTINE

A Jewish attack on Jerusalem, where Israeli forces are reportedly concentrating, may be imminent. Jewish complaints over the difficulty of supplying an Israeli unit isolated on Mt. Scopus north of Jerusalem bear considerable resemblance to the Israeli contention that the recent Negeb thrust was necessary in order to supply isolated Jewish settlements in the area. The Israeli forces may well use this "supply problem" as an excuse for seizing strategic positions around Jerusalem. A somewhat similar situation exists in northern Palestine, where fighting has broken out over alleged Arab efforts to prevent supplies from reaching Jewish settlements in northeastern Galilee. This activity may presage Jewish attempts to take over the whole Galilee area. In the south, meanwhile, the Israeli forces have consolidated their gains in the Negeb and seized Beersheba (on the Egyptian communication line to Hebron and Bethlehem). They are also apparently attempting to break through the Egyptian coastal units to the sea and to take Gaza.

The recent merger of the Arab and Jewish Communist parties of Israel should probably be viewed as a part of a broad program for developing a unified regional Communist movement rather than as an isolated local phenomenon. The hitherto distinct Communist organizations of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Arab Palestine have already banded together to publish a manifesto for Arab consumption. They will probably be joined by the Israeli Communists in a propaganda drive which will: (1) recognize Israel as a going concern; (2) stress working-class unity as against narrow nationalist interests, Jewish as well as Arab; and (3) blame US-UK "imperialist meddling" for the destructive war in Palestine. The adoption of such a propaganda line would tend to indicate that the Soviet Union is

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PALESTINE

no longer content with the negative goal of encouraging discord in the Near East but in addition hopes to obtain widespread positive support for the Communist cause in the region.

IRAQ

Political leaders in Baghdad are disturbed over the possible effect upon the internal security situation should the army be obliged to return from Palestine as a defeated force. The morale of the troops is low, disaffection is widespread, and Communist propaganda is apparently making some headway among the troops. The Assyrian unit now being recruited is reportedly designed eventually to become the Royal Bodyguard, indicating that the Regent entertains some apprehensions regarding the future of the Hashimite House. The Regent's lack of trust in the regular army, which has hitherto been one of his principal sources of support, coupled with continuing economic difficulties, emphasizes the possibility of a serious internal crisis when the armed forces return.

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FAR EAST

CHINA

The departure of Chiang Kai-shek may be one of several important changes in the Chinese National Government caused by increasing official and popular awareness of the Nationalist military and economic weaknesses. The complex and interlocking rivalries of Nationalist China are such that any succeeding government, even though headed by honest and aggressive reformers, would probably be able to obtain less official and popular support than Chiang Kai-shek. T. V. Soong and other powerful regional leaders would tend to look primarily to their own local interests rather than to the problems of the Nationalist administration. Moreover, any new government would be unable to make favorable truce terms with the Communists and would be disposed to accept a face-saving plan which would lead eventually to a Communist-dominated coalition regime.

Chiang Kai-shek's apparent decision to evacuate Mukden via the recently captured port of Yingkou indicates that he has finally decided to abandon Manchuria. However, gathering Communist forces, which have already engaged Nationalist units west of Mukden, threaten to block such a move, and the Nationalist commander reportedly entertains no hope for its success. In China proper, the appearance of several new Communist forces further increases the seriousness of the Nationalist position. One new Communist force of 40,000 now in the area south of Tientsin makes even more tenuous the present Nationalist hold on this vital point. A new column, recently formed in the Tsingtao area, is in a position to join other Communist units in harassing moves along the Tsingtao perimeter.

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CHINA

The Communists continue to plan for a "coalition government" for all China. The Communists' "new political consultative conference to formulate plans for a coalition government" has attracted a mission from the anti-Nationalist Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee (KMTRC) in Hong Kong, and a KMTRC army, under Communist control, may be formed to promote increased defection of Nationalist troops. A "coalition government" of the Communists, the KMTRC, the Democratic League, and other dissident elements may be proclaimed at any time in an attempt to attract wavering Nationalist figures. It appears more likely, however, that the Communists are constructing a framework to accommodate those remnants of the National Government still desirable to the Communists at the time of Nationalist collapse. At that time, this framework will probably become the basis for a coalition government of all China.

The recently-issued gold yuan of China will probably collapse when the Government implements its plan to unfreeze the 19 August price levels. Two major factors forcing this Government action are the acute food shortage in the large cities and the growing shortage of materials for industrial production. An important break in price controls has already been made as a result of the authorization for the army to purchase foodstuffs at the asking price. Once the present controls are removed, it will be virtually impossible for the National Government to re-impose them.

KOREA

An armed invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples' Army is not likely until US troops have been withdrawn from the area or before the Communists

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have attempted to "unify" Korea by some sort of coup. Eventual armed conflict between the North and South Korean governments appears probable, however, in the light of such recent events as Soviet withdrawal from North Korea, intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading south, Peoples' Army troop movements to areas nearer the 38th parallel and from Manchuria to North Korea, and combined maneuvers. Communist agents have been directed to intensify disturbances in South Korea in November, ostensibly to facilitate an invasion early in 1949. Although this invasion may not materialize, such disorders as the recent Yosu uprising (in which a Communist-led constabulary unit attacked town police and constabulary officers) would bolster a Soviet claim before the UN that the South Korean regime is unpopular and supported only by the police and the US Army. Proven Communist complicity in such incidents may react against the USSR in the UN, but Communist efforts to initiate riots and strikes will continue in order to pave the way for North Korean control of the entire peninsula following the withdrawal of US forces.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Communist efforts to influence labor in Latin America have been handicapped by reaction against the resolution denying oil to the US in case of war, passed at the recent Communist-inspired Latin American Oil Workers Congress at Tampico, Mexico. Latin American governments have become increasingly alert to the threat of Communist sabotage, and non-Communist labor groups within Communist-dominated unions are vigorously renewing their efforts to gain control.

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